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To assess the effects of a firm's network of relations on 
innovation, this paper elaborates a theoretical framework 
that relates three aspects of a firm's ego network-direct 
ties, indirect ties, and structural holes (disconnections 
between a firm's partners)-to the firm's subsequent 
innovation output. It posits that direct and indirect ties 
both have a positive impact on innovation but that the 
impact of indirect ties is moderated by the number of a 
firm's direct ties. Structural holes are proposed to have 
both positive and negative influences on subsequent 
innovation. Results from a longitudinal study of firms in 
the international chemicals industry indicate support for 
the predictions on direct and indirect ties, but in the inter- 
firm collaboration network, increasing structural holes 
has a negative effect on innovation. Among the implica- 
tions for interorganizational network theory is that the 
optimal structure of interfirm networks depends on the 
objectives of the network members.@ 
Several recent studies have indicated that the positions of 
firms in interorganizational networks influence firm behavior 
and outcomes (e.g., Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996; 
Walker, Kogut, and Shan, 1997). Because of their facilitative 
role in various interorganizational contexts, network relation- 
ships have even been described as network resources 
(Gulati, 1999). In spite of the growing consensus that net- 
works matter, however, the specific effects of different ele- 
ments of network structure on organizational performance 
remain unclear. In the social networks literature, a debate has 
arisen over the form of network structures that can appropri- 
ately be regarded as beneficial (Walker, Kogut, and Shan, 
1997). According to one view, densely embedded networks 
with many connections linking ego's alters are facilitative for 
ego, and social structures are seen as advantageous to the 
extent that networks are "closed" (Coleman, 1988; Walker, 
Kogut, and Shan, 1997). According to an alternate view, how- 
ever, social structural advantages derive from the brokerage 
opportunities created by an open social structure (Burt, 
1992). Actors can build relationships with multiple discon- 
nected clusters and use these connections to obtain informa- 
tion and control advantages over others (Burt, 1992). From 
the perspective of the network theorist, these differences 
have different, even contradictory, normative implications 
(Walker, Kogut, and Shan, 1997). From Coleman's (1988) 
standpoint, the optimal social structure is one generated by 
building dense, interconnected networks. From Burt's (1992) 
position, constructing networks consisting of disconnected 
alters is the optimal strategy. Clarifying the implications of 
cohesive versus disconnected network structures for various 
organizational outcomes is important to our understanding of 
network resources. 
Relatedly, recent research has led to the important insight 
that building networks with large numbers of indirect ties 
may be an effective way for actors to enjoy the benefits of 
network size without paying the costs of network mainte- 
nance associated with direct ties (Burt, 1992). Although such 
a strategy is undoubtedly conceptually attractive, it appears 
likely that its value in a given circumstance will be contingent 
on several factors. Specifically, the relative value of direct ver- 
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sus indirect ties is likely to depend on the degree to which 
the benefits provided by direct and indirect ties are similar in 
magnitude and content. To the extent that direct ties provide 
different types or amounts of benefits, the possibilities of 
substitution between direct and indirect ties may be limited. 
Thus, examining the content and relative contribution of 
direct and indirect ties may also be relevant from the per- 
spective of designing effective and efficient networks. 
In this study, I examine the relationship between a firm's 
position in the industry network of interfirm collaborative link- 
ages and its innovation output, a significant organizational 
outcome. Scholars in the innovation and interorganizational 
learning literatures have argued that linkages and the resul- 
tant collaboration networks are key vehicles through which 
firms obtain access to external knowledge (Powell, Koput, 
and Smith-Doerr, 1996). Examining the relationship between 
network position and innovation output can provide both an 
elucidation of the role of different elements of network struc- 
ture in the innovation process and an empirical indicator of 
the effectiveness of knowledge flows through such net- 
works. For the purposes of this study, I define an interfirm 
collaborative linkage as a voluntary arrangement between 
independent organizations to share resources. Further, fol- 
lowing past research, I make a distinction between collabora- 
tive arrangements that involve a technological component, 
such as developing a new technology or sharing a manufac- 
turing process, and collaborative arrangements that are 
focused purely on sharing marketing assets or brand names 
(Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994; Singh and Mitchell, 
1996). Similarly, I make a distinction between horizontal and 
vertical linkages (Stuart, 1998; Gulati and Lawrence, 1999). 
For analytic clarity and focus, in this paper, I restrict my atten- 
tion to horizontal, technical linkages, i.e., technical linkages 
between firms in the same industry. 
NETWORK STRUCTURE AND INNOVATION OUTPUT 
Although sociologists have long studied the relationship 
between network structure and innovation, most research in 
this tradition has largely focused on the adoption or diffusion 
of innovations. Even though articles in the popular press and 
academic reports of the innovation-generation process have 
consistently used network metaphors, until recently, relative- 
ly little work has actually used a network analytic approach to 
study innovation generation. Recently, however, a few pio- 
neering studies have explored network structure from the 
perspective of innovation generation (Shan, Walker, and 
Kogut, 1994; Podolny and Stuart, 1995; Powell, Koput, and 
Smith-Doerr, 1996). For instance, Podolny and Stuart (1995) 
explored the factors that determine whether an innovation 
becomes a technological dead end or serves as the basis for 
subsequent innovations. They found that this outcome was 
predicted by the pattern of ties in the technological niche of 
the innovation as well as by the quality of the innovation and 
the status of the innovator, but they did not directly examine 
the role of the interfirm network structure as a predictor of 
innovation output. 
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Other studies that have examined the 
relationship between collaboration and 
innovation include Berg, Duncan, and 
Friedman (1982) and Hagedoorn and 
Schakenraad (1994), albeit from slightly 
different perspectives. Berg, Duncan, and 
Friedman (1982) examined the impact of 
research collaboration on research expen- 
ditures and profitability. Similarly, Hage- 
doorn and Schakenraad (1994) related col- 
laboration to profitability. Neither of these 
studies, however, directly examined the 
impact of collaboration on innovative out- 
put or used a network perspective. 
Collaboration Networks 
Two other studies that have explored the nexus between 
network structure and innovation performance serve as one 
proximate point of departure for the current research.1 In a 
study of biotechnology start-ups, Shan, Walker, and Kogut 
(1994) predicted and found that one element of a firm's net- 
work position, the number of collaborative relationships it 
formed, was positively related to its innovation output. 
Through block modeling, they also developed a more sophis- 
ticated measure of a firm's network position and found that 
this measure was a good predictor of linkage formation, but 
they did not explore the possibility that elements of a firm's 
ego network, other than the number of direct ties, might 
influence innovation output. In another study, Powell, Koput, 
and Smith-Doerr (1996) traced the formation of interfirm 
learning networks for biotechnology start-ups and found that 
centrality in such networks is related to faster subsequent 
growth (in number of employees) for the start-ups, but they 
also did not directly examine the impact of network positions 
on innovation. 
A recent stream of literature that has examined the role of 
different network structures in facilitating outcomes for net- 
work constituents forms the other point of departure for this 
study. In his book, Burt (1992) made a strong case for the 
strategic configuration of networks. According to this concep- 
tion, designing networks to maximize disconnections (or 
structural holes) between alters and selecting alters with 
many other partners (or many indirect ties) are two mecha- 
nisms by which actors can develop efficient and effective 
networks. This conception, however, raises two issues. First, 
as some scholars have noted, the normative importance 
accorded to structural holes by this approach is at odds with 
other theoretical perspectives that stress the importance of 
closed social networks (Walker, Kogut, and Shan, 1997). Sec- 
ond, the strategy of substituting indirect ties for direct ones 
that is endorsed by the effective networks conception pre- 
sumes that direct and indirect ties offer the same content to 
the focal actor. The validity of that assumption may vary sig- 
nificantly across networks. 
The two issues raised above have important implications for 
modeling the impact of network structure on organizational 
outcomes. For instance, the debate on structural holes sug- 
gests that an accurate understanding of the role of structural 
holes in the collaboration network must account for both 
Coleman's and Burt's variants of the argument. Similarly, rec- 
ognizing the possibility that even within the same network, 
direct and indirect ties may vary in their content highlights 
the importance of decomposing the firm's ego network into 
distinct and separate elements and identifying the contents 
transmitted through each type of tie. 
In the technological collaboration network that I studied, 
interfirm collaborative linkages are associated with two dis- 
tinct kinds of network benefits. First, they can provide the 
benefit of resource sharing, allowing firms to combine knowl- 
edge, skills, and physical assets. Second, collaborative link- 
ages can provide access to knowledge spillovers, serving as 
information conduits through which news of technical break- 
throughs, new insights to problems, or failed approaches 
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travels from one firm to another. In distinguishing between 
the resource-sharing and knowledge-spillover benefits of col- 
laboration, it is important to distinguish between know-how 
and information (Kogut and Zander, 1992). Know-how entails 
accumulated skills and expertise in some activity and is likely 
to include a significant tacit or noncodifiable dimension. Infor- 
mation refers primarily to facts, discrete quanta of informa- 
tion that can be transmitted through simple communication 
in relatively complete form and without loss of integrity 
(Kogut and Zander, 1992; Szulanski, 1996). The resource-shar- 
ing benefits of collaboration relate primarily to the transfer 
and sharing of know-how and physical assets, while the 
knowledge-spillover benefits are likely to involve predomi- 
nantly information. 
Three aspects of a firm's network structure are likely to be 
relevant in connection with the above benefits: (1) the num- 
ber of direct ties maintained by a firm, (2) the number of indi- 
rect ties maintained by the firm (the firms it can reach in the 
network through its partners and their partners), and (3) the 
degree to which a firm's partners are linked to each other 
(i.e., whether there are structural holes in the firm's ego net- 
work). Figure 1 identifies these three dimensions in the ego 
networks of two illustrative firms. Firm A has three direct 
ties, to partners B, C, and D. Firm A also has nine indirect 
ties, the nine firms (E through M) that it can reach through its 
partners or their partners. Further, its partners, B, C, and D, 
are all tied to each other, creating a closed network with no 
structural holes (from Firm A's perspective). In comparison, 
Firm 1 has more direct ties (Firms 2, 3, 4, and 5) but fewer 
(only two) indirect ties (Firms 6 and 7). Finally, its partners are 
unconnected to each other, creating an open network with 
several structural holes (the gaps between partners 2, 3, 4, 
and 5). 
Each of these three dimensions of a firm's network, its direct 
ties, indirect ties, and connections between partners, can 
influence the firm's innovation performance. A firm's direct 
ties potentially provide both resource-sharing and knowledge- 
spillover benefits. Indirect ties do not entail formal resource- 
sharing benefits but can provide access to knowledge 
Figure 1. Illustration of direct ties, indirect ties, and structural holes in two networks. 
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Collaboration Networks 
spillovers. Finally, the degree of connectivity between a firm's 
partners influences both resource sharing and access to 
novel information, albeit in contradictory ways. 
Direct Ties, Indirect Ties, and Innovation 
The number of direct ties a firm maintains can affect its inno- 
vative output positively by providing three substantive bene- 
fits: knowledge sharing, complementarity, and scale. First, 
direct ties enable knowledge sharing (Berg, Duncan, and 
Friedman, 1982). When firms collaborate to develop a tech- 
nology, the resultant knowledge is available to all partners. 
Thus, each partner can potentially receive a greater amount 
of knowledge from a collaborative project than it would 
obtain from a comparable research investment made inde- 
pendently. For instance, if two firms contribute an amount of 
$X each to a collaborative R&D effort, then $2X should be 
the amount of collaborative R&D available to each firm, in 
addition to any internal R&D done by each firm. 
Second, collaboration facilitates bringing together comple- 
mentary skills from different firms (Richardson, 1972; Arora 
and Gambardella, 1990). Technology often demands the 
simultaneous use of different sets of skills and knowledge 
bases in the innovation process (Arora and Gambardella, 
1990; Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996). Developing 
multiple, broad competencies or maintaining them in the face 
of rapid technological changes, however, are difficult for firms 
(Mitchell and Singh, 1996). Transactional considerations may 
make the purchase of such technologies infeasible or prohibi- 
tive, leaving internal development and collaboration as the 
only viable alternatives (Mitchell and Singh, 1996). Under 
such circumstances, collaboration can enable firms to enjoy 
economies of specialization without the prior investments 
entailed by internal development. By tapping into the devel- 
oped competencies of other firms, firms can enhance their 
own knowledge base and thereby improve their innovation 
performance. 
A third positive effect of direct ties emerges through scale 
economies in research that arise when larger projects gener- 
ate significantly more knowledge than smaller projects. Col- 
laboration enables firms to take advantage of such scale 
economies. If individual firms have the wherewithal to invest 
an amount X in a given research project, then two firms com- 
bining resources can potentially invest twice as much. If the 
transformation technology is characterized by increasing 
returns, such an investment will lead to a more than propor- 
tionate return in terms of innovation output, benefiting both 
firms significantly. Prior research has also shown a positive 
impact of interfirm collaboration on innovation output. In a 
study of biotechnology start-ups, Shan, Walker, and Kogut 
(1994) found that the greater the number of collaborative link- 
ages formed by a start-up, the higher the number of patents 
it obtained. Thus, other things being equal, I suggest: 
Hypothesis 1: The more direct ties that a firm maintains, the 
greater the firm's subsequent innovation output. 
A firm's collaborative linkages can also provide access to 
knowledge spillovers. Knowledge flows between firms and 
429/ASQ, September 2000 
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industries are constituted of both contractual knowledge 
transfers and relatively informal, uncompensated knowledge 
spillovers or leakages (Jaffe, 1986; Bernstein and Nadiri, 
1989; Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson, 1993). Collaborative 
linkages represent arenas of sustained, focused, and relative- 
ly intense interaction (Auster, 1992). They involve repeated 
and regular meetings between the partners, a focus on speci- 
fied objectives, and entail coordination, close contact, and 
mutual dependency (Gulati and Singh, 1998). Sustained inter- 
action is characterized by frequent communication. Focused 
interaction implies that these ties will be used, significantly, 
and perhaps predominantly, to communicate on a narrow 
range of issues relating to the objectives and subject of col- 
laboration (Rogers and Kincaid, 1981). Intense interaction indi- 
cates that the partners have both a great incentive and 
opportunity to share information (Granovetter, 1973, 1982; 
Boorman, 1975; Krackhardt, 1992). Given these characteris- 
tics of the information-exchange process embodied in an 
interfirm linkage, an interfirm linkage is an important channel 
of communication between the firm and its direct partners. 
An interfirm linkage can also be a channel of communication 
between the firm and many indirect contacts (Mizruchi, 1989; 
Davis, 1991; Haunschild, 1993; Gulati, 1995). A firm's part- 
ners bring the knowledge and experience from their interac- 
tions with their other partners to their interaction with the 
focal firm, and vice versa (Gulati and Garguilo, 1999). A firm's 
linkages therefore provide it with access not just to the 
knowledge held by its partners but also to the knowledge 
held by its partner's partners (Gulati and Garguilo, 1999). The 
network of interfirm linkages thus serves as an information 
conduit, with each firm connected to the network being both 
a recipient and a transmitter of information (Rogers and Kin- 
caid, 1981). 
The role of the interfirm network as an information channel 
and facilitator of knowledge exchange between firms can be 
significant in the technological context (Powell, Koput, and 
Smith-Doerr, 1996). Innovation is often an information-inten- 
sive activity in terms of both information collection and infor- 
mation processing. Individual firms can pursue only a limited 
number of technologies and lines of research, but the net- 
work can increase a firm's catchment area for information 
and provide benefits in two forms. First, it can serve as an 
information-gathering device (Freeman, 1991). Firms can 
receive information on the success and failure of many simul- 
taneous research efforts (Rogers and Larsen, 1984). Promis- 
ing technological trajectories as well as technological dead 
ends can be brought to the early notice of a firm that is 
plugged into the network. Second, the network can serve as 
an information-processing or screening device (Leonard-Bar- 
ton, 1984). Each additional node that a firm has access to can 
serve as an information-processing mechanism, absorbing, 
sifting, and classifying new technical developments in a man- 
ner that goes well beyond the information-processing capabil- 
ities of a single firm. Relevant developments in different 
technologies may be brought to the firm's attention through 
its links, some of whom may specialize in those technologies 
or work with partners who specialize in them (Freeman, 
1982). Alternately, faced with a specific problem, a firm can 
activate its network to identify the sources that are likely to 
be well informed about the specific issue at hand (Freeman, 
430/ASQ, September 2000 
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Collaboration Networks 
1982). Other things being equal, firms that have many indi- 
rect ties, are privy to more information than firms whose 
reach in the network is more limited, which is likely to have 
an effect on innovation: 
Hypothesis 2: The greater a firm's number of indirect ties, the 
greater the subsequent innovation output of the firm. 
The degree to which indirect ties benefit the focal firm, how- 
ever, is likely to be contingent on the number of the focal 
firm's existing direct ties, such that firms with few direct ties 
are likely to enjoy greater benefits from their indirect ties 
than firms with many direct ties. Two arguments support this 
line of reasoning. First, the relative addition to knowledge 
through indirect ties is likely to be greater for firms with few 
direct ties than for firms with many direct ties. For firms with 
limited access to the network through direct ties, the infor- 
mation provided by indirect ties may represent a significant 
increment to the firm's existing information base, while firms 
with many direct ties are already privy to a significant propor- 
tion of the knowledge flow of the network through their 
direct ties. The additional access to information provided by 
their indirect ties may then represent only a marginal incre- 
ment in their knowledge base. 
Second, firms with many direct ties may also be more limited 
in their ability to profit from information from their indirect 
ties. When a firm's partners have many connections, the 
information that reaches the firm through the network also 
reaches many others, the other partners of its partners. 
These partners potentially represent competition for the firm 
in using this information. When information circulates among 
many potential users, the alertness, responsiveness, and 
flexibility of individual users is likely to determine the benefit 
that they obtain from it (Zaheer and Zaheer, 1997). Firms with 
many direct ties may be more constrained in their ability to 
absorb new information or respond to it as flexibly as firms 
with few direct ties (Glasmeier, 1991). Firms with many 
direct ties, being in the thick of things, are less likely to add 
to their knowledge or to absorb as much knowledge through 
their indirect ties than are firms with few direct ties, which is 
likely to have an effect on innovation: 
Hypothesis 3: The impact of indirect ties on a firm's innovation out- 
put will be moderated by the level of the firm's direct ties: the 
greater the number of direct ties, the smaller the benefit from indi- 
rect ties. 
Structural Holes and Innovation 
Recent research suggests that a third dimension of a firm's 
ego network is also likely to be important o innovation: the 
degree of connectivity (or the lack of it) between a firm's 
partners (Burt, 1992). According to Burt's structural hole the- 
ory, ties are redundant to the degree that they lead to the 
same actors. Structural holes are gaps in information flows 
between alters linked to the same ego but not linked to each 
other. A structural hole indicates that the people on either 
side of the hole have access to different flows of information 
(Hargadon and Sutton, 1997). Ego networks rich in structural 
holes imply access to mutually unconnected partners and, 
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consequently, to many distinct information flows. Thus, maxi- 
mizing the structural holes spanned or minimizing redundan- 
cy between partners is an important aspect of constructing 
an efficient, information-rich network (Burt, 1992). 
From the perspective of structural hole theory, ego networks 
in which a firm's partners have no links with each other are 
preferred to networks in which its partners are densely tied 
to each other, but examining the impact of a network rich in 
structural holes on the resource-sharing benefits of the net- 
work reveals a conclusion that is almost diametrically oppo- 
site to the conclusion reached by relating knowledge spillover 
or information benefits to the same network structure. The 
resource-sharing benefits of collaboration arise from firms 
combining their skills, sharing their knowledge, and conduct- 
ing joint projects to obtain scale economies, all of which pre- 
sume the existence of significant trust between the partners. 
Without trust and shared norms of behavior, sharing knowl- 
edge, combining skills, and making large joint investments 
are likely to be difficult and unproductive in any context (Cole- 
man, 1988). In horizontal networks of competitors, the basic 
problem of coordinating interorganizational relationships is 
worsened by a heightened threat of opportunistic behavior 
(Gulati and Singh, 1998). From stealing partners' technology 
to providing poorer quality investments on joint projects, to 
not fulfilling ex ante commitments, alliances offer many 
opportunities for cheating. The development of trust and the 
reduction of opportunism are then likely to be necessary pre- 
conditions for successful resource sharing. 
Extensive relations between partners can foster the develop- 
ment of shared norms of behavior and explicit interorganiza- 
tional knowledge-sharing routines (Uzzi, 1997; Walker, Kogut, 
and Shan, 1997; Dyer and Noboeka, 2000). The social con- 
straints associated with dense, embedded networks can 
facilitate large relationship-specific investments that help 
maximize the benefits from collaboration (Walker, Kogut, and 
Shan, 1997). Common partners can serve as referral agents 
and relay expectations and responsibilities as part of the 
process of bringing together two hitherto unconnected firms 
(Gulati, 1995; Uzzi, 1997). They can also use their relation- 
ships with both parties to encourage cooperation, reciprocity, 
and sharing (Uzzi, 1997; Gulati, 1999). Deeply embedded net- 
works can also foster fine-grained information transfer and 
joint problem solving (Uzzi, 1997), two essential components 
of successful resource sharing. 
Dense ties between partners are also likely to help in curbing 
opportunism (Coleman, 1988; Walker, Kogut, and Shan, 1997; 
Rowley, Behrens, and Krackhardt, 2000). In closed networks, 
in which ego's partners are connected to each other, informa- 
tion about one actor's opportunistic acts diffuses rapidly to 
other related actors, and sanctions for deviant behavior are 
more easily imposed (Walker, Kogut, and Shan, 1997). Fur- 
ther, in such a highly interconnected system, deviant behav- 
ior is less likely to arise because the threat of reputation loss 
with respect to multiple partners will discourage firms from 
behaving opportunistically with any single partner. By con- 
trast, in an open network in which ego's partners are not 
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Collaboration Networks 
linked to each other, the possibility of opportunistic actions is 
greater. 
The contradictory effects of connections between partners 
thus prompt two competing predictions with respect to the 
relationship between structural holes and innovation. Many 
structural holes in ego's network will increase ego's access 
to diverse information and, hence, enhance innovation out- 
put. Conversely, ego networks with fewer structural holes 
might promote trust generation and reduce opportunism, 
leading to more productive collaboration from the perspective 
of resource sharing. 
Hypothesis 4a: The greater the structural holes spanned by a firm, 
the greater the firm's subsequent innovation output. 
Hypothesis 4b: The greater the structural holes spanned by a firm, 
the less the firm's subsequent innovation output. 
METHODS 
I chose to conduct my research in the chemicals industry for 
several reasons. First, technological collaboration has been 
and continues to be a significant feature of this industry. Sec- 
ond, patents are a meaningful measure of innovation in this 
industry. The link between patents and innovation is likely to 
be stronger in industries in which patents provide firms with 
fairly strong protection for their proprietary knowledge. Prior 
research indicates that the chemicals industry is one in which 
patents are generally regarded to be effective and used wide- 
ly and consistently, relative to most other industries (Levin et 
al., 1987). 1 tested the hypotheses on a longitudinal data set 
comprising the linkage and patenting activities of 97 leading 
firms from the chemicals industry in Western Europe, Japan, 
and the United States. The sample was selected to include 
the largest chemicals firms in these three areas, which con- 
stitute the core of the global chemicals industry, to ensure 
the availability and reliability of data. Information on the key 
variable, collaborative linkages, is extremely difficult to obtain 
for smaller firms over an extended time period. Past network 
studies on alliances have used a similar strategy of focusing 
on the leading firms in an industry (Gulati, 1995; Gualti and 
Garguilo, 1999). 
Innovation output, the dependent variable, was measured 
through the patenting frequency of each firm, the number of 
patents received in a given year. Patents are an important 
measure of innovation output because they are directly relat- 
ed to inventiveness, they represent an externally validated 
measure of technological novelty (Griliches, 1990), and they 
confer property rights on the assignee and therefore have 
economic significance (Kamien and Schwartz, 1982; Scherer 
and Ross, 1990). Further, empirical studies have shown that 
patents are closely related to measures such as new prod- 
ucts (Comanor and Scherer, 1969), innovation and invention 
counts (Kleinecht, 1982; Basberg, 1983; Achilladelis, 
Schwarzkopf, and Cines, 1987), and sales growth (Scherer, 
1965). Expert ratings of corporate technological strength.have 
also been found to be highly correlated with the number of 
patents held by corporations (Narin, Noma, and Perry, 1987). 
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The use of patents as a measure of innovative output has 
some limitations, too. Some inventions are not patentable, 
others are not patented for strategic reasons. Further, firms 
may differ in their patenting propensity (Cohen and Levin, 
1989; Griliches, 1990). Research, and the logic of appropri- 
ability, indicate that the degree to which these factors are a 
problem varies significantly across industries (Levin et al., 
1987; Cohen and Levin, 1989). This insight provides a partial 
solution to the problem, in that an appropriate research 
design can be used to control for interindustry differences in 
patenting propensity (Basberg, 1987). Limiting the study to a 
single industrial sector in which patents are a meaningful indi- 
cator of innovation minimizes such problems, as the factors 
that affect patenting propensity are likely to be stable within 
such a context (Basberg, 1987; Cohen and Levin, 1989; 
Griliches, 1990). Because, even within an industry, firms 
might differ in patenting propensity for unobserved reasons, I 
treated this as a problem of unobserved heterogeneity and 
controlled for such variations through my statistical approach. 
I identified the leading firms in the chemicals industry from 
lists that are published annually by trade journals such as 
Chemical Week and C&E News. To minimize survivor bias, I 
selected the sample from the lists at the beginning of the 
study period. In these published lists subsidiaries were often 
listed separately from parent firms. From an original sample 
of approximately 120 firms, after matching subsidiaries with 
their parent firms, a sample of 107 firms remained. For ten of 
these firms, reliable patent data or covariate data could not 
be obtained, and they were dropped from the analysis. The 
remaining firms include all the key players in the industry 
over the study period. The panel is unbalanced, as some of 
the firms were acquired by other firms or restructured so as 
to make comparison difficult beyond a particular year. A full 
list of the sample firms is available from the author. 
Data 
I obtained yearly patent counts, collaboration data, and firm- 
attribute data for the firms in the sample. The panel used for 
the analysis includes collaborative activity for the period 
1981-1991 and patenting activity for the period 1982-1992, 
reflecting a one-year lag between collaboration and patenting. 
I used U.S. patent data for all firms, including the foreign 
firms in the sample, to maintain consistency, reliability, and 
comparability, as patenting systems across nations differ in 
the application of standards, system of granting patents, and 
value of protection granted. The U.S. represents one of the 
largest markets for chemicals, and firms desirous of commer- 
cializing their inventions would patent in the United States if 
they were to patent anywhere at all. This observation is sup- 
ported by statistics from the U.S. Patent Office, which indi- 
cate that almost half of all U.S. patents are issued to foreign 
entities. Prior research using patent data on international 
samples has followed a similar strategy of using U.S. patent 
data for international firms (Stuart and Podolny, 1996; Stuart, 
1998). 
To obtain patent counts for each firm, I prepared a list for 
each firm in the sample of all its divisions, subsidiaries, and 
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joint ventures, using Who Owns Whom (United States, Unit- 
ed Kingdom and Ireland, Continental Europe, and Asia edi- 
tions) and the Directory of Corporate Affiliations. Thereafter, I 
traced each firm's history through the study period to 
account for any name changes and reorganizations and to 
obtain information on the timings of events such as the 
founding and dissolution of joint ventures. This master list 
was used to identify all patents issued to the sample firms. 
The list of chemicals patents owned by these firms was 
derived from the above master list using the technology-class 
information on the patents. The U.S. patent system classifies 
the technology domain into 400 broad classes and several 
hundred thousand subclasses nested within the classes. 
Patent examiners assign each patent to a primary technology 
class. The Patent Manual was used to identify the technology 
classes corresponding to chemicals. Using the identified 
technology classes, I separated the chemicals patents of the 
sample firms from other patents they obtained. Finally, I com- 
puted the patent count for each firm for each year by assign- 
ing to that firm all chemicals patents issued solely to the firm 
or to its subsidiaries and half of the chemicals patents issued 
jointly to the firm and a partner or issued to joint ventures of 
the firm. This was done to avoid spurious inflation of patent 
counts through double counting of jointly held patents. 
I obtained data on collaboration through detailed archival 
research on the chemicals and materials sector, using three 
main types of data sources to identify linkage activity: (1) 
electromagnetic databases, including both general business 
news media such as the Dow Jones News Retrieval Text 
Index and sector-specific databases such as Metadex, (2) 
general business print media, such as the Frost and Sullivan 
Predicasts Index (U.S., International, and Europe), as well as 
industry-specific publications, such as Chemical Week and 
Plastics Technology, and, (3) government publications and 
consultant reports for the chemicals industry. The data collec- 
tion and coding exercise for the entire data set involved 
studying over 130,000 electronic news stories and dozens of 
text works. The full data set includes details on corporate col- 
laborative actions across all functional areas in the chemicals 
and materials sector. For the current study, I used a subset of 
the data covering the technical collaboration activities of the 
sample firms over the period 1981 to 1991. The linkages 
used here include 268 joint ventures, in which the collaborat- 
ing firms formed a new organizational entity, and 152 joint 
research or technology-sharing agreements, in which no new 
organization was formed. 
In previous studies, lack of available data on linkage dissolu- 
tion has meant that a distinction has not usually been made 
between linkages formed by the firm and the linkages main- 
tained by the firm at any point in time. Thus, I attempted to 
record dissolution or continuity information for all linkages. 
This also helped to ensure that linkages that were announced 
but subsequently did not materialize were identified and 
removed from the data. This effort produced mixed results. 
For the joint ventures in the sample, the exercise was quite 
successful. For 191 of the 268 joint ventures, I was able to 
establish either the date of dissolution or the survival of the 
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joint venture beyond 1991, the concluding year of this study. 
For several of the remaining joint ventures I was able to 
establish continuity of operations until some date between 
the date of founding and 1991. This occurred when the last 
information available about the joint venture was dated prior 
to 1991 but did not refer to dissolution activity. I treated all 
joint ventures for which I did not have a record of dissolution 
as continuing to exist until 1991 for two reasons. First, my 
success at identifying dissolutions in the majority of cases 
led me to believe that, at least for this sample of firms, joint 
venture dissolution tends to be reported. Hence, the absence 
of a confirming report of dissolution was best interpreted as 
an indicator of continuing operations. Second, in many of the 
cases, trade and news reports indicated ongoing operations 
or specific activities at these joint ventures for several years 
after founding. The fact that other news about these ven- 
tures was being reported made it seem likely that their disso- 
lution would also be reported. Assuming continuity in the 
absence of news of dissolution seemed to be the more accu- 
rate assumption to make about these ventures. 
The situation was quite different for research agreements 
and technology development and sharing arrangements not 
involving the formation of a separate entity. For such agree- 
ments, I coded dissolution based on the tenure specified in 
the formation announcement or on a formal notice of conclu- 
sion of the research, when available. For long-term (multi- 
year) or general programs of research, one of the two above 
conditions was often the case. In the majority of cases, how- 
ever, I was unable to establish formal dissolutions. In such 
cases, I presumed the agreement to exist until the last year 
in which it was documented or until the year after the year it 
was founded, whichever was later. The assumption that such 
agreements have a short life relative to joint ventures is con- 
sistent with the specific and short-term nature of their objec- 
tives in most cases. For research agreements, there were 
also~cases in which the existence or ongoing activities of a 
collaboration were discussed but the founding of the collabo- 
ration itself was not reported or indicated. In such cases, I 
treated the collaboration as having been founded in the year 
immediately prior to the year in which it was first 
documented. 
Financial figures and employment data came from COMPUS- 
TAT, Worldscope (several volumes), trade publications, com- 
pany annual reports, Japan Company handbooks and Daiwa 
Institute research guides. For all firms, financial data were 
converted to constant (1985) U.S. dollars to ensure standard- 
ization within the sample. 
Model Estimation and Econometric Issues 
Model specification. The dependent variable, innovation out- 
put as represented by patent counts, is a count variable and 
takes only non-negative integer values. The linear regression 
model assumes homoskedastic, normally distributed errors. 
Because these assumptions are violated with count variables, 
a Poisson regression approach is more appropriate (Haus- 
man, Hall, and Griliches, 1984). To account for unobserved 
heterogeneity, the possibility that observationally equivalent 
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firms may differ on unmeasured characteristics, I used the 
panel Poisson approach (Hausman, Hall, and Griliches, 1984) 
and estimated random effects Poisson models. In the ran- 
dom effects Poisson model, an additional effect, p*, is includ- 
ed in the Poisson specification to reflect firm-specific hetero- 
geneity: 
E(Pjt/Xl1) = eXit3+,.i 
This firm-specific effect permits observations of the same 
firm to be correlated across periods and thus builds serial 
correlation directly into the model. Further, the Ri is assumed 
to be drawn from the gamma distribution. This specification 
of ah implies that the variance to mean ratio is no longer 
unity, as is assumed in the regular Poisson model but, 
instead, becomes (1 + xaXt), in which ax is the reciprocal of 
the standard deviation of the heterogeneity distribution. Thus, 
in this model, the ratio of the variance to the mean is permit- 
ted to grow with the mean (Hausman, Hall, and Griliches, 
1984). The model estimates ax from the observed data and 
thus directly captures any overdispersion. 
Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984) also provided a fixed- 
effects estimator for count data that handles unobserved het- 
erogeneity by computing within-firm estimates of the coeffi- 
cients. In this approach, only the variation within a firm 
across time is used to estimate the regression coefficients. 
Thus, unobserved variations between firms are not problem- 
atic because between-firm variation is not used in the com- 
putations of the estimates. In this paper, for robustness, I 
used both fixed effects and random effects to estimate the 
models. 
Measures 
Dependent Variable. I measured Patentsit, as the number of 
successful patent applications, or granted patents, for firm i 
in year t. The majority of patent applications are examined 
and ruled upon within two to three years of application. The 
granted patent carries the date of the original application. I 
used this date to assign a granted patent to the particular 
year in which it was originally applied for. For instance, a 
patent applied for in 1986 but granted in 1988 is considered a 
1986 patent. This procedure permitted consistency in the 
treatment of all patents and controlled for differences in 
delays that may occur in granting patents after the application 
is filed. Because patents are likely to correspond to activity 
immediately preceding the patent application, I used a one- 
year lead with respect to key influences, such as R&D and 
linkages. Thus, the patent count for 1986 is regressed 
against the 1985 values of other covariates such as R&D and 
direct ties. 
Independent Variables 
Direct and indirect ties. To obtain a count of the direct ties 
maintained by a firm in any year, I counted the number of 
direct partners of the focal firm, or its degree centrality in the 
network. Hypothesis 1 predicted a positive impact of this 
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variable on patenting frequency. I used three alternative mea- 
sures to capture a firm's reach in the network through its 
indirect ties. The first variable was a simple count of indirect 
ties (indirect ties, count). For each firm, I computed the num- 
ber of other firms in the network that it was tied to at path 
distances of two or greater, which thus excluded direct ties. 
But this simple count of indirect ties does not account for the 
weakening or decay in tie strength between firms that are 
connected by increasingly large path distances. For instance, 
this measure counts both two-step-distant ties (firms that are 
linked to the focal firm through only one intermediary firm 
when using the shortest path between the two firms) and 
five-step-distant ties (firms that are linked to the focal firm 
through four intermediary firms when using the shortest path 
between the two firms) as the same. Yet it is probable that 
as the shortest paths connecting two firms grow longer, the 
likelihood of information transmission between them 
decreases. Burt (1991) provided a frequency decay measure 
that accounts for this decline in tie strength across progres- 
sively distant ties. This measure (indirect ties, distance- 
weighted count) attaches weights of the form 1 - [fi/(N+1)1 
to each tie, where f1 is the total number of nodes that can be 
reached up to and including the path distance i, and N is the 
total number of firms that can be reached by the focal firm in 
any number of steps. The argument for this weighting 
scheme is that the rate at which the strength of a relation 
decreases with the increasing length of its corresponding 
path distance should vary with the social structure in which it 
occurs (Burt, 1991). The larger the number of firms to which 
the focal firm must devote its network time and energy, the 
weaker the relationship that it can sustain with any individual 
firm. Thus, decay in relationship strength is related to the 
number of other firms reached at each path distance. For 
example, for a firm with 3 direct ties, 5 two-step ties, and 7 
three-step ties (here N = 15, i.e., 3 + 5 + 7), the frequency 
decay formula will attach weights of 1 - (3/16) = 13/16 to 
each direct tie, 1 - 8/16 = 8/16 to each two-step tie, and 1 - 
15/16 = 1/16 to each three-step tie. Thus, ties at progressive- 
ly longer path distances receive progressively smaller 
weights. The total number of indirect ties weighted by their 
path distances can now be computed easily. In this illustra- 
tion, the weighted count of indirect ties for this hypothetical 
firm is 5(8/16) + 7(1/16) = 47/16. 
I devised a third measure (indirect ties, distance and informa- 
tion weighted count) that is a refinement of Burt's frequency- 
decay measure. Burt's measure accounts for lowered proba- 
bilities of information transmission across longer path 
distances but implicitly assumes that all nodes generate the 
same amount of new information. In a technology network, 
some firms may create more knowledge than others and 
could hence be the source of more information. Accordingly, 
each node could be weighted by the amount of new informa- 
tion it generates. The number of new patents created by a 
firm provides at least a crude measure of the variations 
across firms in their new knowledge creation capabilities. 
Hence, for each node (firm), I used the number of patents 
applied for by the firm in that period as the weight for that 
node in the computation. Operationally, for each firm, I multi- 
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plied the vector of Burt's frequency-decay weighted path dis- 
tances by the vector of patent counts to compute this new 
variable. For example, if the 5 two-step ties of the hypotheti- 
cal firm described above produced 1, 2, 4, 6, and 8 patents, 
respectively, while the 7 three-step ties produced 2, 4, 6, 8, 
10, 0, and 5 patents, respectively, then the patent-weighted 
measure of indirect ties would have a value of 12 and 11/16 
1(8/16)(1 + 2 + 4 + 6 + 8) + (1/16)(2 + 4 + 6 + 8 + 10 + 0 + 
5)] for this firm. 
Direct ties x Indirect ties represents the interaction between 
the two prior variables. Hypothesis 3 predicted a negative 
impact of this variable on patenting frequency. There are 
three versions of this variable, based on the three measures 
of indirect ties. I used the ratio of nonredundant contacts to 
total contacts for the ith firm (Burt, 1991) to measure the 
structural holes in the ego network of a firm. This measure is 
computed as 
[1j[1-1q PiqMjql I / Ci, 
where pjq is the proportion of i's relations invested in the con- 
nection with contact q, mjq is the marginal strength of the 
relationship between contact j and contact q, and Ci is the 
total number of contacts for firm i. Higher values on this 
index reflect firms whose ego networks are rich in structural 
holes, i.e., the firms' partners are not connected to each 
other. If all of a firm's partners are unconnected to each 
other, the index takes a value of 1, indicating that none of the 
firm's contacts are redundant. Connections between a firm's 
partners imply a higher lqqpiqmjq and thus a lower value for 
this index, reflecting higher redundancy and fewer structural 
holes. For firms without any partners, the index is set to 0. I 
used STRUCTURE (Burt, 1991) to compute this measure. 
Control variables. R&D expenditures are likely to be a signif- 
icant determinant of innovative outcomes. I collected R&D 
data from COMPUSTAT, Worldscope, DIR Analyst's guides, 
Japan Company handbooks, industry and company journals, 
and annual reports. When R&D data were not available for 
some periods, I used a regression imputation procedure (Lit- 
tle and Rubin, 1987) to impute missing values for this vari- 
able and complete the data. In a few cases, this imputation 
procedure led to negative or improbable values for R&D, so I 
estimated R&D individually using data from the most recent 
available periods for that firm. Since the dependent variable, 
patents, includes only chemicals patents, an appropriate con- 
trol would be to include only the R&D expenditures on chem- 
icals-related businesses rather than corporate R&D. Unfortu- 
nately, business-level research expenditures are not 
commonly reported. As an approximation, I obtained the ratio 
of chemicals sales to total sales for each firm and applied it 
to the corporate R&D figures to obtain chemicals R&D. I 
used the natural log of chemicals R&D expenditures as a 
control variable in all models. 
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It is conventional to control for firm-size effects in analyses of 
innovative productivity (Cohen and Levin, 1989). 1 used the 
natural log of number of chemicals employees as a measure 
of firm size. Number of employees was obtained from COM- 
PUSTAT, Worldscope, Japan Company handbooks, and indus- 
try and company journals and reports. As with R&D, to obtain 
the number of employees in the chemicals businesses of the 
firm, I multiplied the total number of employees by the ratio 
of chemicals sales to total sales. 
Arguments have been made for both positive and negative 
impacts of diversification on innovation performance (Cohen 
and Levin, 1989). 1 do not make any prediction on the sign of 
this effect but control for its influence by including the vari- 
able diversification, entropy. The following formula was used 
to calculate the measure: 1P. x In(1/Pd), where Pi is defined 
as the percentage of firm sales in business segment j and In 
(1/P.) is the weight for each segment j (Palepu, 1985). 
Firms can vary in their area of strategic focus within an indus- 
try, and different industry segments can offer differing 
degrees of opportunity to innovate. Thus, some firms may be 
active in relatively richer technological domains than other 
firms. To capture the firm-specific differences in areas of 
strategic focus, I constructed a measure of technological 
opportunity. For each firm, I identified the technological class- 
es in which it was active in any year. I then identified the 
number of total patents in that set of classes by the U. S. 
Patent Office in that year. Thereafter, using the firm's own 
distribution of patenting effort across classes as weights, I 
computed a weighted indicator of the relative richness of the 
firm's specific environment. The weights reflect the fact that 
the firm's own efforts across those classes were not distrib- 
uted equally. As an illustration, say that Firm A has patented 
in technological classes 1, 2, and 3 in 1983 and obtained 5, 
20, and 25 patents in these classes, respectively. I obtained 
the total patents in these classes from the U.S. Patent data- 
base in that year, as 400, 1000, and 600. The value of the 
technological-opportunity variable for this firm-year observa- 
tion would then be 400(5/50) + 1000(20/50) + 600(25/50) = 
740. Essentially, high values of this variable indicate that the 
firm was involved in technology segments that offered rela- 
tively higher opportunity to innovate than other segments. 
Firms conducting research in multiple geographic regions 
may enjoy access to more diverse knowledge environments, 
which may influence innovation output. To control for the 
geographic breadth of a firm's research efforts, I computed 
the variable international research presence as the Herfindahl 
index of the firm's patenting across nations in that year. The 
U.S. Patent database provides information on the physical 
location of the inventor at the time of the invention. Based on 
this, it is possible to construct an indicator of the distribution 
of a firm's inventive efforts across nations. The Herfindahl 
index is computed as INi2, where N1 is the proportion of the 
firm's patents in nation i. A firm with a research presence dis- 
tributed across several nations will have a lower score on this 
index than one whose research efforts are concentrated in a 
single nation. For instance, a firm with 100 patents split 
equally over five nations will have a Herfindahl index score of 
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5 (0.20)2 = 0.20. Another firm with the same number of 
patents, but active in only one nation, will have a Herfindahl 
index score of 1. 
It is possible that in an interfirm technology network the 
structural-holes measure might capture the technical diversity 
of the skill bases in a firm's alliance network rather than the 
social structural effects postulated here. If a firm's partners 
are active in widely divergent technological areas, they may 
be unconnected to each other and, hence, generate structur- 
al holes in the focal firm's network. At the same time, such 
diversity in the partner base may make successful collabora- 
tion unlikely for largely technical reasons, such as absorptive 
capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Lane and Lubatkin, 
1998; Stuart, 1998). If so, then the structural-holes measure 
might reflect the negative effects of this technological dis- 
tance between partners rather than social structural effects. 
To control for this possibility, I created a variable, technologi- 
cal distance between partners, to capture the degree of 
diversity of a firm's partners. To compute the technological 
distance between partners, I used the approach suggested 
by Jaffe (1986). First, I used the distribution of a firm's prior 
patenting across the patent classes provided by the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), to construct a 
vector representing each firm's position in technology space. 
In this vector, each USPTO technology class represents a dis- 
tinct dimension, and for any firm, the proportion of the firm's 
patents that fall within the technology class is the value of 
the corresponding element in this vector. For instance, if a 
firm had obtained 20 percent of its patents in the Kth technol- 
ogy class, then the Kth element of the vector for this firm 
would have a value of 0.20. After representing all the firms in 
this technology space, for each firm, I calculated the Euclid- 
ean distance between all pairs of its partners and took the 
average of these distances as the value of the variable, tech- 
nological distance between partners. If partners are techno- 
logically distant from each other, in that they have very differ- 
ent technological backgrounds as represented by their prior 
patenting focus, then this variable should have a relatively 
high value. If they focus on the same technology classes and 
have very similar patenting profiles across the classes, then 
the value of this variable will be relatively low. To illustrate, if 
Firm A has 10 percent of its patents in Class A, 40 percent in 
Class B, 50 percent in Class C, and 0 percent in Class D, 
while Firm B has 40 percent of its patents in Class A, 0 per- 
cent in Class B, 10 percent in Class C, and 50 percent in 
Class D, then the technological distance between the two 
firms can be computed as the Euclidean distance between 
the vectors: 0.1, 0.4, 0.5, 0 and 0.4, 0, 0.10, 0.5, i.e., the 
square root of the sum [(0.1 - 0.4)2 + (0.4 - 0.0)2 + (0.5 - 
0.1)2 + (0.0 -0 .5)2]. Computing this distance between all of 
a firm's partners and taking the average of these distances 
provides the value of this variable for a given firm-year. 
I also included variables to control for the profitability and liq- 
uidity of firms. Profitability was captured through a return on 
assets variable, while liquidity was represented through the 
current ratio (ratio of current assets to current liabilities). Over 
time, innovation rates can increase or decrease for all firms. I 
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controlled for such period effects by including a series of 
dummies for every year from 1981 to 1990, 1991 being the 
omitted category. I also included control variables for the 
nationality of the firms; Japan and USA were dummy vari- 
ables coded to equal 1 for Japanese and American firms, 
respectively. European firms constituted the omitted 
category. 
RESULTS 
Table 1, which provides descriptive statistics for the linkage 
network over time, shows that the mean number of direct 
ties grew steadily over the period of the study, reaching a 
peak in 1990 and then declining in 1991. The overall density 
of the network indicates the proportion of potential network 
ties that are actually realized and reflects the same trend, 
peaking at 5.7 percent. Thus, the network is relatively sparse, 
with less than 6 percent of potential connections actually 
being realized. The distribution of ties is captured by the two 
remaining variables in table 1. The percentage of isolates indi- 
cates the firms that maintain no ties at all. The percentage of 
such firms steadily declines from 26 percent in 1981 to 9 per- 
cent in 1989 before increasing to 1 1 percent by 1991. Thus, 
in most years, over 80 percent of the firms had at least one 
direct tie. The network centralization measure indicates the 
degree to which a single actor dominates the network. If link- 
ages are distributed equally among all nodes, this index has a 
low value. It reaches zero when all firms have the same num- 
ber of ties. High values on this variable indicate that linkage 
activity is centered in one leading firm, and relatively few link- 
ages occur between other firms. The observed values indi- 
cate that network centralization is moderate, reaching a peak 
of around 22 percent in the mid-eighties. Thus, it appears 
that even though most firms are linked to the network, some 
are significantly more active than others. 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics and correlations for all 
variables for the 996 observations in the sample. Even 
though the sample represents the prominent firms in the 
industry, there is considerable variance on all the key vari- 
ables, such as patents, R&D, direct ties, and log employees. 
The three measures for indirect ties are relatively highly cor- 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics on the Linkage Network 
Network Network 
Mean density S. D. centralization % 
Year degree (%) Degree Min. Max. (%) Isolates 
1981 3.34 2.9 3.64 0.0 18 14 26 
1982 3.77 3.4 4.19 0.0 25 1 8 22 
1983 4.23 3.7 4.52 0.0 27 19 20 
1984 4.31 3.9 4.53 0.0 27 18 14 
1985 4.64 4.1 4.69 0.0 29 21 13 
1986 5.11 4.3 5.13 0.0 31 22 14 
1987 5.38 4.6 5.25 0.0 28 20 1 1 
1988 5.86 5.2 5.53 0.0 28 16 1 1 
1989 6.19 5.4 5.88 0.0 34 1 9 9 
1990 6.70 5.7 6.64 0.0 34 19 1 1 
1991 6.43 5.6 6.40 0.0 29 18 14 
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2 
For the interaction variable, the correla- 
tions between the component terms and 
the interaction terms were high. I took 
several steps to address this issue. For 
instance, I also reran the analyses, after 
centering both component variables on 
their means prior to constructing the 
interaction term, for all three versions of 
the Direct ties x Indirect ties variable 
(Cronbach, 1987; Jacquard, Turrisi, and 
Wan, 1990). This transformation reduced 
the higher correlation between the com- 
ponent terms and the interaction term in 
all cases. For the transformed (mean- 
deviated) variables the correlations 
between the component terms and the 
interaction terms were -.20, and -.92 
(versus -.11 and .99 earlier) for Direct ties 
x Indirect ties, count, -.57 and -.67 (ver- 
sus .22 and .94 earlier) for Direct ties x 
Indirect ties, distance weighted count, 
and -.50 and -.60 (versus .32 and .89 ear- 
lier) for Direct ties x Indirect ties, dis- 
tance and information weighted count. 
Additionally, since some of the variables 
are meaningful only for firms with two or 
more ties (structural holes, technological 
distance between partners), I also reran 
the analysis using only the 744 observa- 
tions that represent firm-years with two 
or more linkages. Since firms with no ties 
have zeroes on all network variables 
(direct ties, indirect ties, structural holes), 
omitting these observations leads to a 
sample with lower correlations between 
the network variables. Finally, as a further 
cross-check against collinearity, I estimat- 
ed the models on subsamples after ran- 
domly omitting observations to check the 
stability of the estimated coefficients. 
I report these results below. 
Collaboration Networks 
related with each other, as would be expected. Among the 
independent variables, the measure for structural holes is 
correlated with the three measures for indirect ties.2 
In table 3, I report the results of the regression analyses 
using the random-effects Poisson estimators. Model 1 pre- 
sents the base model with only the control variables. Model 
2 adds the direct ties variable to the specification. Models 3a 
through 3c add the three measures of indirect ties, respec- 
tively. Models 4a through 4c add the interaction terms, Direct 
ties x Indirect ties (three measures), and models 5a through 
5c add the structural holes variables to complete the specifi- 
cation. I use the complete specification (models 5a to 5c) to 
discuss the results. 
The results support the predictions for all four hypotheses. 
The coefficient of direct ties is positive and significant, sup- 
porting hypothesis 1, which predicted a positive impact of 
direct ties on firm innovation output. The indirect ties coeffi- 
cient (all three measures) is positive and significant, support- 
ing hypothesis 2's prediction of a positive relationship 
between indirect ties and firm innovation output. Hypothesis 
3, predicting a negative impact of the interaction between 
direct ties and indirect ties on the innovation output of a firm 
is supported, the negative and significant coefficient indicat- 
ing that having a higher number of direct ties reduces the 
impact of indirect ties. Finally, hypothesis 4 proposed com- 
peting predictions for the effect of structural holes on firm 
innovation output. The data indicate, in support of Coleman's 
position, that having many structural holes is associated with 
reduced innovation output. 
Two aspects of the above results are worth probing further. 
First, providing some quantitative indication of the interaction 
effect could help in interpreting the results. Second, examin- 
ing the relative magnitude of the effects of direct and indirect 
ties is of intrinsic interest. To illustrate the interaction effect 
first, suppose that a firm is at the mean level of direct ties (5) 
and has 20 indirect ties. For this firm, indirect ties increase 
the patenting rate by a multiplier of 1.03 (= exp[0.051 *2 - 
0.007*5*2]). Now, consider another firm that is also at the 
same level of indirect ties (20) but has 6 direct ties. For this 
firm, indirect ties raise the patenting rate by a multiplier of 
1.016 (= exp[0.051*2 - 0.007*6*2]). Thus, having a higher 
level of direct ties reduces the benefit from indirect ties. 
To compare the relative strength of the direct and indirect tie 
effects, we can examine the impact of a one-standard-devia- 
tion increase in each on the patenting output of a firm. Con- 
sider a firm (as above) that has 5 direct ties and 20 indirect 
ties. For such a firm, a one-standard-deviation increase in 
direct ties increases the patenting rate by 23 percent 
[5.4(0.057 - 0.007*2) = 0.231. For the same firm a one-stan- 
dard-deviation increase in indirect ties increases the patenting 
rate by 4 percent [2.746(0.051 - 0.007*5) = 0.041. Thus, the 
coefficient on the indirect-ties variable suggests that indirect 
ties do contribute to innovation output; however, the magni- 
tude of this contribution is significantly smaller than the con- 
tribution made by direct ties. 
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Table 2 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations (N = 996) 
Mean S. D. 1 2 3 4 
1. Patents1t 51.18 82.67 
2. Direct tiesit1l 5.27 5.40 .30 
3. Indirect ties/10, counti11 6.37 2.75 .11 .28 
4. Indirect ties, dist. wtd. t-1 19.42 8.92 .04 .05 .96 
5. Indirect ties, dist. & info. wtd. t-* 12.25 6.50 -.03 .06 .88 .88 
6. Direct ties X Indirect ties/1 0, counti 1 37.70 36.25 .31 .99 .35 .11 
7. Direct ties X Indirect ties, dist. wtd. It-1 104.4 84.15 .32 .94 .44 .22 
8. Direct ties X Indirect ties, dist. & info. wtd. * 66.54 58.04 .25 .89 .43 .21 
9. Structural holes1t 1 .79 .32 .14 .31 .86 .82 
10. Diversification, entropyit 1 1 .29 .33 .36 .18 .10 .07 
11. International research presencei 1 .86 .20 -.24 -.00 -.03 -.04 
12. Technological opportunityi1 15.68 6.02 .17 .24 .18 .10 
13.Return on assetsit 1 .03 .03 .15 -.07 -.02 -.01 
14. Current ration 1 1.58 .62 .23 -.18 -.19 -.15 
1 5.Japan .43 .50 -.28 .27 .14 .06 
16. USA .26 .44 .17 -.23 -.10 -.05 
17. R&Djt 1 3.48 1.56 .66 .39 .18 .08 
18. Firm sizers1 1.94 1.30 .65 .22 .05 .01 
19.Tech. Distance between partnersit 1 .28 .21 .10 .40 .50 .43 
20.Year 1981 .09 .28 -.03 -.1 1 -.18 -.13 
21.Year 1982 .09 .29 -.04 -.08 -.1 1 -.07 
22.Year 1983 .09 .29 -.04 -.06 -.13 -.07 
23.Year 1984 .09 .29 -.02 -.05 .01 .05 
24. Year 1985 .10 .29 -.02 -.03 .02 .02 
25.Year 1986 .09 .29 -.01 .00 -.05 -.08 
26.Year 1987 .09 .29 .02 .02 .09 .08 
27.Year 1988 .09 .28 .05 .05 .13 .13 
28.Year 1989 .09 .29 .04 .07 .14 .11 
29.Year 1990 .09 .28 .03 .11 .09 .01 
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
6. Direct ties X Indirect ties/1 0, counts 1 .13 
7. Direct ties X Indirect ties, dist. wtd. it-1 .22 .97 
8. Direct ties X Indirect ties, dist. & info. wtd. it .32 .94 .95 
9. Structural holesit 1 .71 .33 .40 .37 
10. Diversification, entropyit 1 .00 .19 .21 .16 .13 
11. International research presencet,1 -.03 -.02 -.04 -.03 -.03 -.20 
12.Technological opportunityit1 .20 .27 .27 .33 .09 .07 .17 
13.Return on assetst,1 .01 -.04 -.04 -.03 -.03 -.1 1 -.14 .01 
14. Current ratioit1 -.14 -.18 -.20 -.20 -.16 .03 -.16 .02 .39 
1 5.Japan .10 .27 .27 .28 .06 -.10 .48 .26 -.38 
16. USA -.07 -.23 -.25 -.24 -.08 -.13 .12 -.01 .42 
17. R&Dit. .07 .42 .43 .40 .20 .24 -.37 .27 .22 
18. Firm sizeit 1 -.08 .23 .25 .18 .10 .35 -.52 .00 .21 
19.Tech. Distance between partnerst,1 .33 .42 .51 .44 .43 .19 .02 .14 -.18 
20.Year 1981 -.17 -.14 -.14 -.16 -.12 -.01 .06 -.10 -.02 
21.Year 1982 -.15 -.11 -.1 1 -.14 -.09 .02 .02 -.08 -.15 
22. Year 1983 -.20 -.09 -.07 -.14 -.07 .02 .00 -.16 -.06 
23. Year 1984 -.13 -.05 -.04 -.13 -.01 .00 .01 -.1 1 .06 
24.Year 1985 -.05 -.03 -.03 -.07 .01 .00 .03 -.08 -.07 
25.Year 1986 -.09 -.02 -.04 -.05 .00 .02 -.01 -.04 -.01 
26.Year 1987 .06 .04 .05 .03 .06 -.01 .00 .00 .08 
27. Year 1988 .22 .09 .12 .16 .07 -.01 -.01 .10 .16 
28.Year 1989 .28 .11 .12 .21 .07 .00 -.04 .18 .11 
29. Year 1990 .18 .13 .09 .19 .06 .00 -.03 .19 .03 
Several of the control variable results are also significant 
(models 5a, 5b, and 5c). Technological distance between part- 
ners was negative and significant, supporting the argument 
that absorptive capacity issues are likely to be important in 
the context of technology alliances (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; 
Stuart, 1998). R&D and firm size are both positively associat- 
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3 
I also conducted several supplementary 
analyses to evaluate the robustness of 
the results, including reestimating the 
models after centering the direct ties and 
indirect ties variables on their means prior 
to creating the interaction terms, using a 
Poisson fixed-effect specification instead 
of the random effects reported here, and 
repeating the analyses with a sample of 
firms with two or more linkages only. The 
results (available from the author) were 
very similar to the reported results. To fur- 
ther investigate the possibilities of 
collinearity problems, I randomly omitted 
observations from the full sample to cre- 
ate 300 subsamples, each of which had 
between 650 and 900 observations. I 
then reestimated these models on all 300 
subsamples. A warning sign of collinearity 
problems is that omitting even a few 
observations can cause significant 
changes in the coefficient estimates and 
drive them to insignificance or cause the 
coefficients to be significant but reversed 
in sign (Greene, 1997: 420). Even though 
in half the samples more than one-third of 
the observations were omitted, these 
sensitivity analyses provided strong sup- 
port for the reported results. 
Collaboration Networks 
Table 2 (continued) 
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
1 5.Japan -.51 
16. USA .28 -.51 
17. R&Dit 1 .20 -.40 .17 
18.Firm sizeit 1 .22 -.64 .26 .80 
19.Tech. Distance between partnersit 1 -.31 .23 -.21 .17 .11 
20.Year 1981 .00 .01 .00 -.12 .00 -.02 
21.Year 1982 -.03 .00 .00 -.1 1 .00 -.01 -.10 
22.Year 1983 -.04 -.01 .00 -.08 .00 .02 -.1 0 -.1 0 
23.Year 1984 -.04 .00 .01 -.07 .01 .02 -.10 -.10 -.10 
24. Year 1985 -.04 -.01 .00 -.05 .01 .04 -.10 -.10 -. 10 
25. Year 1986 -.03 .00 -.01 .02 .01 .00 -.10 -.10 -. 10 
26.Year 1987 .05 .00 .00 .05 -.01 -.01 -.10 -.10 -. 10 
27.Year 1988 .03 .01 .00 .08 -.01 -.03 -.10 -.10 -.10 
28.Year 1989 .05 .00 -.01 .08 -.01 -.01 -.1 0 -.1 0 -.1 0 
29.Year 1990 .02 .01 .00 .10 .00 .01 -.1 0 -.1 0 -.10 
23 24 25 26 27 28 
24.Year 1985 -.10 
25.Year 1986 -.10 -.10 
26.Year 1987 -.10 -.10 -.10 
27.Year 1988 -.10 -.10 -.10 -.10 
28.Year 1989 -.10 -.10 -.10 -.10 -.10 
29.Year 1990 -.10 -.10 -.10 -.10 -.10 -.10 
* Measured in 1 00's. 
ed with patenting frequency, The estimated coefficient, how- 
ever, is significantly less than unity in all three specifications. 
If the regressor variables are in log form, as it is for these 
two variables, then the coefficients of the Poisson specifica- 
tion can also be interpreted as elasticities of the regressor 
variable with respect to the dependent variable. Here, the 
positive but less than unity coefficient on R&D and firm size 
indicates that patenting frequency increases with R&D 
expenditures and firm size, but it does so less than propor- 
tionately. This is broadly consistent with past research (Acs 
and Audretsch, 1988, 1991). 
Being a diversified firm is negatively associated with patent- 
ing frequency in this research. Prior research on the impact 
of diversification on innovative activity has been mixed, with 
studies showing both a positive and a negative impact of 
diversification on innovation (Cohen and Levin, 1989). Two 
broad arguments relate diversification to innovative output. 
Diversification can encourage innovation by providing a stimu- 
lus of multiple knowledge bases within a single firm, leading 
to cross-fertilization of ideas. Diversification can also imply 
increased bureaucratization and operational controls within 
firms and inhibit innovation. The results of this research sup- 
port the latter interpretation, that being active in multiple 
businesses is associated with a negative effect on patenting. 
Among the other control variables, current ratio, the measure 
of liquidity, was positively associated with patenting. The 
estimated alpha coefficient is positive and significantly differ- 
ent from 0. This indicates that there were significant firm- 
level unobserved effects in the data that were captured by 
the heterogeneity parameters 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study examined the impact of three aspects of a firm's 
ego network-direct ties, indirect ties and structural holes- 
on the innovation output of the firm. The theoretical frame- 
work suggested that the three aspects of network structure 
play different roles in the innovation process. According to 
this framework, direct ties serve as sources of resources and 
information, indirect ties serve primarily as sources of infor- 
mation, and structural holes between partners serve two 
contradictory roles. They expand the diversity of information 
that the firm has access to but also increase the firm's expo- 
sure to potential malfeasance. In this study, I predicted, and 
found, that direct and indirect ties influence innovation output 
positively, but the impact of indirect ties is moderated by the 
firm's level of direct ties. Finally, I presented competing pre- 
dictions about the effect of structural holes in the focal firm's 
network and found that, at least in this interfirm collaboration 
network, increasing structural holes decreases innovation 
output. The findings have some important theoretical implica- 
tions. 
This study was motivated by two theoretical puzzles and 
their implications for firms in interorganizational networks. 
First, I sought to evaluate the idea that building networks 
with large numbers of indirect ties may be an effective way 
for actors to enjoy the benefits of network size without pay- 
ing the costs of network maintenance associated with direct 
ties (Burt, 1992). Second, I sought to understand the degree 
to which closed or open networks could be appropriately 
regarded as the normative ideal (Coleman, 1988; Burt, 1992; 
Walker, Kogut, and Shan, 1997). The arguments and conclu- 
sions of this study shed some light on both of these issues. 
The results of this study both vindicate and qualify the pre- 
scription to use indirect ties as an efficient and effective way 
of maximizing network benefits. In an interfirm technology 
linkage network, a firm's indirect ties serve as a mechanism 
for knowledge spillovers and contribute positively and signifi- 
cantly to its innovation output. Given that, unlike direct ties, 
indirect ties entail relatively low or no maintenance costs for 
the firm, these benefits are extremely welcome. Thus, the 
results provide support for the basic premise that network 
effectiveness can be enhanced through indirect ties (Burt, 
1992). But the paper also suggests that caution is required 
before interpreting these results as a mandate to build large 
networks of indirect ties. The arguments and findings of this 
paper draw attention to three factors that need to be consid- 
ered before embarking on a strategy of substituting indirect 
for direct ties. 
First, this study highlights the fact that even within the same 
network, direct ties and indirect ties can differ significantly in 
the nature or content of benefits that they provide to the 
focal actor. Although I did not directly measure the contents 
of direct and indirect ties, I argued that in the interfirm link- 
age network these ties differ in the nature of benefits 
offered: direct ties provide resource-sharing and information- 
spillover benefits, but indirect ties provide only the latter. 
Clearly, under these circumstances, the degree of substitu- 
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tion possible between direct and indirect ties is limited. More 
generally, this finding suggests that the value of a strategy of 
substituting indirect ties for direct ties will vary significantly 
across networks. In any network, an analysis of the substan- 
tive benefit provided by each kind of tie must be conducted 
before a network reconfiguration is attempted. 
A second aspect, closely related to the previous one, is that 
even when direct and indirect ties provide the same kind of 
benefit, the magnitude of the benefits provided by indirect 
ties may be significantly different from those provided by 
direct ties. The results of this paper suggest that the actual 
magnitude of benefits from indirect ties is relatively low. 
Although this result could be peculiar to this setting, one 
argument suggests that this result may actually be more 
widely applicable. This conclusion is based on one key 
insight: in many networks, indirect ties simultaneously play 
two different roles vis-6-vis the focal actor. On the one hand, 
they are resources that extend the actor's reach in the net- 
work and improve his or her access to information. On the 
other hand, in many networks, such indirect ties are also 
competitors of the focal actor in terms of using such informa- 
tion. To illustrate this dual aspect of indirect ties, figure 2 
(adapted from Burt, 1992) shows a firm X that builds a direct 
tie to a partner (1) who has three other partners (2, 3, and 4). 
These three indirect ties (firms 2, 3, and 4) are now potential- 
ly providers of information to the focal firm (X), and news of 
new technical developments arising in one of these firms can 
make its way to the focal firm through the common partner 
(1). Thus, adding the indirect ties has extended the focal 
firm's information reach in the network significantly. Yet mov- 
ing our focus away from the focal firm and onto the indirect 
ties themselves draws attention to another, less benign 
Figure 2. Illustration of indirect ties in a network as both resources and 
competitors (adapted from Burt, 1992: 20). 
15 
14 1 
10 16 
FIRM X 
8~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
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aspect of this network. These indirect ties, linked to the focal 
firm through the common partner, are also linked to each 
other through the same common partner. Information that 
arises in one of these indirect ties, say Firm 2, reaches the 
focal firm, but it also reaches the other indirect ties, Firms 3 
and 4. If the same information can be used profitably by the 
other firms, and one firm's use of it precludes its most fruit- 
ful use by another, then the network benefits that accrue to 
the focal firm are likely to be much smaller than might other- 
wise be anticipated by a simple consideration of its expanded 
reach. More generally, this argument suggests that the 
degree to which indirect ties provide benefits of greater infor- 
mational reach will vary by the nature of the information and 
the network. To the extent that the sources of information in 
many networks are also potential users of similar informa- 
tion, competition to use the information within the clusters in 
which it originates can reduce the benefits that ego can 
expect from even an effectively configured network. 
The negative interaction between direct and indirect ties sug- 
gests a third reason to be careful in terms of evaluating the 
impact of indirect ties. Although individually higher numbers 
of direct ties and indirect ties are both beneficial, having 
many indirect and many direct ties is not necessarily better. 
Between the more limited addition to their knowledge base 
through their indirect ties and their more constrained ability 
to absorb and act on the information, actors with many direct 
ties may be unable to profit from their indirect ties as can 
actors with fewer direct ties. Thus, in addition to being limit- 
ed in magnitude, the value of indirect ties is also likely to be 
contingent on the number of a firm's direct ties (see also 
Burt, 1997). This conclusion is likely to apply in particular to 
networks such as the one described above, in which many 
actors can potentially use the same information. In such net- 
works, alertness, responsiveness, and flexibility are likely to 
be important in terms of profitably using information obtained 
through network ties (Zaheer and Zaheer, 1997). 
The above arguments suggest several mechanisms that 
potentially limit the benefits of indirect ties, but my objective 
in presenting these arguments is not to indicate that indirect 
ties are inferior to direct ties or vice versa. Rather, it is to 
draw attention to a broader conclusion: whether direct ties 
are more productive than indirect ties depends on the con- 
text being studied, and the effects of ties, whether direct or 
indirect, are likely to be contingent on several factors. The 
nature and content of the ties, the type of outcome being 
studied, and the broader network structure within which a tie 
is embedded are all likely to influence the value of a tie. 
Although, in this study, indirect ties provided relatively less 
significant benefits than direct ties, that conclusion is unlikely 
to be universally true. For instance, in Bian's (1997) analysis 
of job searches in China, direct ties provide only an interme- 
diation benefit by connecting potential employees with job- 
granting officials, while the indirect tie in the form of the job- 
granting official provides the more substantive benefit of an 
actual job. 
The arguments and findings on structural holes further rein- 
force the basic conclusion that the impact of different net- 
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work attributes and positions can only be understood relative 
to a particular context. The strategy of matching the type of 
benefit (resource sharing versus information spillovers) with 
the form of social structure (a closed versus an open net- 
work) by itself draws attention to the contradictory effects of 
network structure on innovation output. The results of the 
statistical analyses further contribute to illuminating the 
debate on the appropriate form of facilitative social struc- 
tures. In interorganizational collaborations, it appears that the 
benefits of increasing trust, developing and improving collab- 
oration routines, and reducing opportunism that are provided 
by a group of cohesive interconnected partners outweigh the 
disadvantages of not having the informational diversity that is 
provided by having many structural holes in a firm's network. 
Reconciling this result with that of an earlier study on struc- 
tural holes and innovation is useful. In an interesting process 
study of innovation, Hargadon and Sutton (1 997) demonstrat- 
ed how a firm exploits its position as the spanner of structur- 
al holes to develop new products. On the surface, the results 
of that study appear to conflict with the findings reported 
here, but a key difference between the network context they 
depict and the one studied here is relevant. In Hargadon and 
Sutton's (1997) study, the focal firm is a product-development 
consulting firm that bridges structural holes between clients 
in different industries. Here, the network consists of collabo- 
rative linkages between firms in the same industry. Thus, the 
nature of ties between firms varies significantly for the two 
networks. Collaboration and resource sharing between com- 
petitors, two salient features of this network, are not the 
issue in Hargadon and Sutton's network. Rather, the key prin- 
ciple there is brokerage. By contrast, in the collaboration 
between competitors that is studied here, developing norms 
of cooperation is likely to be especially important, hence the 
benefits of interconnected, closed networks. Again, the basic 
conclusion that emerges from the above comparison of 
results between this study and Hargadon and Sutton's (1997) 
study is that whether structural holes are good, bad, or irrele- 
vant is liable to be a function of the context. When develop- 
ing a collaborative milieu and overcoming opportunism are 
essential to success, closed networks are likely to be more 
beneficial. When speedy access to diverse information is 
essential, structural holes are likely to be advantageous. 
My final point concerns the implications of the contingency 
arguments highlighted above for the broader, developing 
literature on network resources and social capital (Adler and 
Kwon, 1999). Although the facilitative role of networks has 
led to their identification as network resources or social capi- 
tal (Burt, 1997; Gulati, 1999), and network attributes have 
been associated with several distinct benefits, such as trust, 
information, and power, scholars have been unable to agree 
on the form of social structures that constitute social capital 
or network resources. For instance, cohesion theorists have 
presented densely interconnected networks as the normative 
ideal (Coleman, 1988). Conversely, others have emphasized 
the benefits of structural-hole-rich networks (Burt, 1992). 
Scholars in a third tradition have argued that a network of 
partners exclusively tied to a focal actor is to be preferred to 
one in which the focal actor's partners have many other part- 
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ners (Cook and Emerson, 1978; Brass and Burkhardt, 1992). 
For the actor seeking to develop social capital, these posi- 
tions suggest a confusing panoply of choices. At one level, 
the arguments of this paper add further complexity to this 
problem by highlighting the fact that each of these social 
structural choices in fact entails a significant trade-off 
between two potentially beneficial network outcomes. 
Densely interconnected networks enable trust but limit the 
inflow of diverse and fresh insights. Structural-hole-rich net- 
works provide informational benefits but inhibit trust develop- 
ment. Partners exclusively tied to an actor provide power 
benefits, but it is partners with many other partners that pro- 
vide the indirect ties that enhance his or her informational 
reach within the network. At another level, however, the con- 
clusions of this study suggest a path out of this dilemma. 
The arguments and results from this study suggest that the 
debate about the appropriate form of social capital may be 
profitably informed by the extension of an established princi- 
ple of organization design to the network arena: the optimal 
structural design is contingent on the actions that the struc- 
ture seeks to facilitate (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). What 
constitutes an enabling social structure for one set of actions 
may well be disabling for others (Podolny and Baron, 1997). 
Thus, the form taken by social capital is likely to be contin- 
gent on what actors seek to enable through it. Under the 
appropriate circumstances, exclusive, cohesive, and non- 
redundant connections can all constitute social capital. A net- 
work composed of relationships with partners with few ties 
to others would facilitate control over exchange partners 
(Cook and Emerson, 1978; Brass and Burkhardt, 1992). Such 
a network might be the objective for a firm seeking power 
over its buyers or suppliers (Porter, 1980). A network com- 
posed of partners with many interlocking and redundant ties 
would facilitate the development of trust and cooperation 
(Granovetter, 1985; Coleman, 1988; Portes and Sensenbren- 
ner, 1993). Such a network may be useful from the firm's 
perspective when it and its partners are faced with a com- 
mon external threat, for instance, adverse political or legisla- 
tive actions, or in the context of standard setting in high-tech- 
nology industries (Oliver, 1990; Kogut, Walker, and Kim, 
1995). Finally, a network of many non-overlapping ties would 
provide information benefits (Burt, 1992). Such a network 
would be ideal for an organization whose primary business 
entails the brokerage of information or technology (Hargadon 
and Sutton, 1997). Identifying the benefit sought from a 
social structure is therefore likely to be critical in identifying 
the form of social structure that is most likely to be facilita- 
tive. What this study has shown is that there is no simple, 
universal answer. 
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